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COMMENTS
thought that communication with morning readers was separate and
distinct from communication with evening readers. The alleged
"tying" product (communication with morning readers) was not sepa-
rated from the "tied" product (communication with evening readers) ;
the two together formed a single product (communication with
readers). The market for communication, therefore, was not separted,
but was only one market. It was this undivided market that the de-
fendant did not control. The Court held that, because the principal
case did not factually fit the "tying" pattern, the restraint which
resulted from the use of the unit contracts was not unreasonable per
se. The Court further found that there was no proof in the record of
the specific intent necessary for an unreasonable restraint of trade
under section 1 or an attempt to monopolize under section 2.
The trial court attempted to straddle the issue of whether there
was a violation per se, and reached a decision that could not be upheld
on any ground because the court had not required proof of a specific
intent. The decision of the Supreme Court is sound because it requires
definite proof of individuation of products in "tying" cases.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-WAIVER
OF UNANIMOUS VERDICT
Hibdon v. United States 204 F.2d &34 (6th Cir. 1953)
Appellant was tried in a federal court for commission of a felony.
After twenty-seven minutes of deliberation the jury reported that they
were unable to agree on a verdict. Both parties then agreed, at the
suggestion of the judge, to accept a majority verdict. A poll of the
jury disclosed a majority in favor of conviction, and the trial court
entered a verdict of guilty. The appellate court reversed the lower
court's judgment, remanded the case for a new trial, and held that a
defendant on trial in a federal court for commission of a felony can-
not waive his right to a unanimous verdict by the jury.1
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a unanimous ver-
dict.2 The court in the principal case points out that there is no pro-
vision in the present Rules for a waiver of this requirement by the
accused, despite the fact that such a provision was found in the First
Preliminary Draft of the Rules.2
Many of the rights guaranteed to an accused by the Constitution
1. Hibdon v. United States. 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953).
2. FuD. R. CR. P. 31 (a): "The verdict shall be unanimous."
3. FED. R. C& P. 29 (a) (First Prelim. Draft, 1943). The reason for the elimi-
nation of this provision was the adverse criticism of both the judiciary and the
bar. HIibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 836 (6th Cir. 1953).
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may be waived. The right to a speedy trial,4 the right to a trial by
jury,' the right to a twelve man jury,6 the right to a trial in the state
and district where the alleged crime was committed, 7 the right to con-
front witnesses,8 and the right to have assistance of counsel9 may all
be waived by an accused in a criminal proceeding. The basis of these
decisions is that the rights are privileges accorded to the accused to
protect his interests, and that if he decides freely that his interests
will be better served by waiving the privileges, he should be allowed
to waive them.10
In Patton v. United States"l a jury of twelve was duly impaneled,
but seven days after the trial began one of the jurors became seriously
ill and could no longer serve. Both parties agreed to finish the case
with the eleven remaining jurors. The question of the constitutional-
ity of the eleven man jury was certified to the Supreme Court of the
United States. The Court stated that the elements of jury trial guar-
anteed by the Constitution are (1) that the jury shall consist of
twelve persons, (2) that the jury be advised and instructed by a judge,
and (3) that the verdict be unanimous.'2 The Court held that the de-
fendant had the power to waive his right to the first element because
it was a "privilege" and not an "imperative requirement."1 The Court
also reasoned that, because the accused could waive his right to all
three elements as a unit and be tried by the court, he could make a
partial waiver and waive the numerical requirement. 4
The question presented by the principal case was one of first im-
pression, and could not have been unequivocally answered by logical
deduction from the Patton case. A holding that one element of a jury
trial may be waived does not require a holding that a different element
may be waived. The requirement of a twelve men jury could be a
4. Moreland v. United States, 193 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1951); Sheperd v.
United States, 163 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1947); Worthington v. United States, 1
F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1924) cert. denied, 266 U.S. 626 (1924).
5. Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Simons v. United States, 119
F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1941). See Wright v. United States 165 F.2d 405, 408 (8th
Cir. 1947); Jabezynshi v. United States, 53 F.2d 1014 (ith Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 546 (1931).
6. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Fowler v. Hunter, 164 F.2d
668 (10th Cir. 1947). See Coater v. Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414, 423 (S.D. Ga.
1942).
7. United States v. Jones, 162 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Mahaffey v. Hudspeth,
128 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1942); Hagner v. United States, 54 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir.
1931).
8. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1911); Burgess v. King, 130 F.2d 761
(8th Cir. 1942) ; Grove v. United States, 3 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1925).
9. Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938) ; Butzman v. United States, 205 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1953).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949). See
notes 4-9 sura.
11. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
12. Id. at 288.
13. Id. at 298.
14. Id. at 290.
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privilege, and at the same time the requirement of unanimity could
be considered as an imperative requirement.
The issue of the relinquishment of the unanimity requirement should
be resolved by reference to the underlying social policies. It could be
argued that most defendants cannot properly evaluate the protection
afforded by the unanimity requirement and consequently could not
make an intelligent waiver. It could also be argued that the unanimity
requirement is closely allied with the requirement of proof of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, and that if waiver were allowed an accused
could be convicted even though some of the triers of fact were not
convinced of his guilt. It could also be said that to allow an accused
to wager his freedom on his guess as to which way the jury was split
would introduce into criminal trials a singularly inappropriate element
of chance.
The result reached by the court in the principal case is supported
by the fact that a provision for waiver of unanimity was considered
but not included in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It may
be, however, that the history of the unanimity provision does not re-
solve the issue; the failure to include a provision for waiver does not
necessarily require an implication of an intent to prohibit waiver.
The rights guaranteed by the Constitution are intended for the
protection of the accused. If the accused in a prosecution intelligently
decides that his interests will be advanced by discarding some of his
Constitutional protections, he should be allowed to do so. He is in a
much better position to weigh the various factors of his particular case
than is a legislator formulating abstract rules to cover all cases. It is
submitted that the result reached by the court in the principal case is
incorrect, and that the requirement of unanimity, like the other Con-
stitutional protections, should be subject to waiver.
EVIDENCE--EXPERT OPINION ON ULTIMATE FACTS
Hooper -v. General Motors Corp., 260 P.2d 549 (Utah 1952)
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover
damages for injuries sustained when her truck overturned due to a
separation of the rear wheel. An expert witness for the defendant was
asked what caused the separation. The plaintiff's objection to the
question on the ground that it called for opinion testimony on the
ultimate fact in issue was overruled. The Utah Supreme Court, affirm-
ing the ruling of the trial court, said that an expert witness may ex-
press an opinion as to the cause of any particular condition or occur-
rence, and may do so with any degree of positiveness he deems neces-
sary.'
I. Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 260 P.2d 549 (Utah 1953). (Reversed on
other grounds.)
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